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THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
By

MICHAEL

S. BARAM

S CIENCE
and technology increasingly work changes in the complex
matrix of society. These changes pervade our

ecological systems and
our physical and psychic health. Less perceptibly, they pervade our
culture, our values, and our value based institutions such as the law.
In turn, our values and institutions shape the progress and utilization
of science and technology.
As we know, science and technology have provided society with
enormous material benefits and a higher standard of living and health.
But we now realize that this process has been accompanied by alarming
rates of resource consumption and many new hazards to ecological
systems and health.
Social response to these unexpected problems has been of a remedial
nature - e.g., how to diminish pollution through regulation and technology. But it must be repeated that our values and institutions shape
the progress and use of science and technology, and therefore the fundamental social response must be of a preventative or a priori nature to
the extent that this is possible.
This important task can be described as the need to formulate
coherent and humane social controls on science and technology.
Of course when we talk about science and technology, we are not
discussing discrete activities. We are depicting an interrelated number
of events which occur across a spectrum which ranges from basic
research through applied research and developmental technology to
application and use technologies.
Since World War II, events along this spectrum have been highly
dependent on federal funds. In 1969, approximately 65 percent of the
funds expended in the United States for basic research, applied research,
and development technology were provided by federal agencies. This
reliance on federal support provides some justification for public interest
in the social control of science and technology.
Most such social change occurs during the latter stages, where technology is manifested either in specific acts - such as organ transplantation techniques - or as part of a major public or private system - such
as nuclear energy or computer applications.
The most substantial expenditures and investments occur during
the developmental technology stage, after a number of important decisions have been made to pursue development of prototypes, production,

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

application, and use. Of the approximately $17 billion of federal support
for research and development in 1969, it is estimated that $5 billion
went for research, and $11 billion for development. Production and
application activities undoubtedly involved billions more. Similar ratios
prevail in the private sector.
These investments must be recognized in human as well as economic terms, for it is during the development and subsequent technology
stages that large numbers of engineers, administrators, managers,
production and shop personnel, salesmen, and subcontractors commit
their careers, personal values, and families - ultimately their communities- to the specific technological activity or system. Therefore,
all subsequent social controls must consider this set of political, economic, and human factors which has been developed.
Numerous social controls on science and technology have been
developing and functioning over the years.
The table on page 569 suggests in generalterms what these controls
are and where they function in relation to the spectrum of activities.
The cluster of legal doctrines in the table all function during the
advanced technology stages, after decisions committing economic and
human resources have been made, and normally after injury has
occurred. By this time, fully developed systems and practices are in use
without coherent controls.
This has led to condemnation of law as a modern system of control.
As Jacques Ellul has said:
The judicial regime is simply not adapted to technical civilization, and
this is one of the causes of its inefficiency and of the ever greater

contempt felt toward it.
Law is conceived as a function of a traditional society. It has not
registered the essential transformation of the times. Its content is exactly
what it was three centuries ago. It has experienced only a few frag-

mentary transformations (such as the corporation) - no other attempts at modernization have been made. Nor have form and methods

varied any more than content. Judicial technique has been little affected
by the techniques that surround us today; had it been, it might have
gained much in speed and flexibility.
Faced with this importance of the law, society passes to the opposite extreme and burdens administration with everything that is the
product of the times in the judicial sphere. Administration, because it
is better adapted from the technical point of view, continually enlarges
its sphere at the expense of the judicial, which remains centered on
vanishing problems such as codicils, community reversions, and the
like. These last, and all similar problems that are the exclusive concern
of our law, are problems that relate to an individualistic society of pri-

vate property, political stability, and judicial subtlety."
In specific terms, the legal system has not interposed itself as an
effective control on science and technology; it does not perform a
control function early enough on the spectrum of events.
1J. ELLUL, Ti-E

TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 251

(1964).

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF SCIENCE

1970

569

SOCIAL CONTROLS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Production,
Basic
Science

Development
Technology

Applied
Science

Application,
Use, Technology

Patents, Copyrights,
Trade Secrets
Torts

IMEM

Consitutional Rights

IMIM

Land Use
Consumer Protection
Experimentation
Private Sector
Industry-Consumer Markets
Industrial Associations
and Labor Unions
Insurance

...
: :::!:..*
. :::;
:::!:
:..M$..
. ..

.

;...

.Nom:?..

Crusaders and Citizen Groups
Federal Government
Executive Agencies
Programs
Congressional Action
Funds
Agency Classification

4 ~

4.

4

~.

..~,,.,,

t5..~

4

Regulation-EfficacySafety

'.:>

Scientific Peer Groups
Professional Associations

1L~1~ .~g

Education-Ethics
4

....

i6(iA..

Harold Green, in discussing this issue, has said:
The basic question is whether our legal system is capable of imposing
effective social control over new technologies before they inflict very
substantial, or even irreparable injury upon society. It seems clear that
we cannot rely on the courts alone to protect society against fast-moving
technological developments. Judge-made rules of law always come
after, and usually long after, the potential for injury has been demon2
strated ....

This characteristic of retroactivity limits the ability of the legal
system to respond to a number of modern social problems, in particular
2

H. GREEN, The New Technological Era: A View From The Law in
(Program of Policies Studies, George Washington University 1967).
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the harmful effects of science, technology, and environmental deterioration. Retroactivity is inherent in a legal system based on the values and
conflicts of the private sector of society. The courts have not been
designed to serve as oracles, but to grapple with actual conflict manifested in specific acts or injuries. They lack the technical, astrological,
or other expertise needed for the difficult task of evaluating present
diffuse effects and future effects. Consequently, the courts are reluctant
to impose controls and, for example, have rarely intruded on the
substantive decisions of public agencies, which presumably are technically expert.
Judicial procedures which reinforce concepts of justice and due
process, and include statutes of limitations, and rules of evidence and
standing, have also brought an immobility to the law so that it cannot
respond easily to issues of deleterious damage or public health.
Recent developments in environmental litigations have ameliorated
some of these procedural obstacles, particularly the issue of standing
for citizen's groups alleging other than economic injuries. However, in
Sierra Club v. Hickel,3 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
denied that the Sierra Club had standing because the Club had not
alleged that its members would be affected, beyond displeasure, by the
scheduled action of the Department of the Interior. This may indicate
that the bounds of procedural flexibility have been reached.
This list of legal problems is incomplete, but is sufficient to justify
the conclusion in a recent law review note that "[tlhe passive nature
of the courts and the difficulties encountered in their use make it clear
that they cannot serve as society's primary instrument for technology
assessment."

4

The controls of the private sector are similarly clustered in the
advanced technology and use stages. Industrial decisions and insurance
controls are implemented without full consideration of the public
interest. Decisions are made on market or profit considerations, based
on what the consumer wants or can be manipulated to want, and do
not consider larger public interests in the preservation of natural resources or public health. Advertisements boost sales of items attractive
to individual consumers, but which collectively erode environmental
quality, other public interests, and, ultimately, private interests.
Sales of snowmobiles to the new breed of armchair sportsmen now
climb to 1/2 million annually and provide a current case in point, but the
automobile represents the ultimate absurdity. Auto birth rates are now
treble human birth rates in the United States, 10 million to three million.
Auto death rates occur in similar ratio. Our automobiles produce most
3 39 U.S.L.W. 2180-81 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1970).

4 Portnoy, The Role of Courts in Technology Assessment,. 55 CORNELL L. REv. 861
(1970).
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of our air pollution, are dangerously designed, and are not economically
recycled. How much longer can these absurd ratios and harmful effects
be tolerated, despite the importance of the industry to the economy?
Obviously, many of our problems labeled technology induced or
environmental, are in reality, the behavioral problems of a materialistic
society. As such, we cannot expect effective private sector controls to
emerge, nor can we expect courts to alter such "normal" behavior.
Crusaders and citizen's groups have recently proven somewhat
effective as technology-curbers, but have not provided coherent, a priori
controls. Crusaders are in short supply, and citizen's groups lack funds,
technical expertise, and national political strength. They can only attack
discrete problems, often on a local scale, and must ultimately resort to
the legal system with its shortcomings.
The Internal Revenue Service is now reconsidering the tax exempt
status of public interest groups which litigate or support litigation for
environmental protection and other "public good" purposes. Its decision
may preclude, in an economic sense, most of the litigation which could
5
force onto the legal system an assessment and control function.
The task of the public interest group is made extremely difficult
by the fact that, once again, substantial economic and human commitments have already been made in support of harmful developments,
on a scale far larger than the immediate interests represented by such
groups. Without substantial evidence of harm to public health, such
groups appear to represent merely their own aesthetic or otherwise
elitist values, or a Luddite revival. This is not said to disparage such
activities. They have served to educate and involve citizens and represent an exciting and valuable development.
The public agencies have actual and potential social control functions across the complete spectrum of scientific and technological
activities. But this role is inextricably wound up with their several other
functions which include the promotion of certain activities for national
purposes like defense or the balance of payments, and the regulation
of activities according to numerous criteria having little relationship
to the social interest.
Agencies possess the financial and technical resources, and sometimes the authority, to function as effective social controls, but have in
general failed to do so. Reasons for this failure have often been cited
and are true to varying degrees: bureaucracy and inertia, ignorance and
lack of sensitivity to noneconomic interests, fragmentation of authority
by design or by new developments which supercede them.
Legislation has proven no guarantee of implementation. The refuse
section of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act6 is a potentially powerful
5 1 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 629 (1970).
6 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
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source of authority for combatting most forms of water pollution as
they occur. Yet for 70 years, it has been ignored by the Corps of
Engineers and the Department of Justice.
The rational measure of reorganizing the federal agencies or
creating new administrative bodies to better control science and technology has been under discussion for some time. This would enable one
or several new and prescient groups to function as long-range planners
with coherent control authority. For example, a single agency could
perhaps determine national and regional energy needs, then plan, license
for construction, and regulate in the public interest more effectively
than the present multiple-agency situation. Reliance on teams of technical experts and experts from other fields such as law, health, and
economics could be built into such reorganization plans.
These are certainly steps in the right direction. Of our present array
of social controls, perhaps the public agencies (which support most
research and development) could effectively perform assessment and
control functions where they are most important - before there is large
scale development and commitment of economic and human resources.
Hugh Folk, in considering present and future social control by
7
public agencies, has already discerned some pragmatic problems.
Experts will once again be drawn from the same pool. Many will
actually have contributed, in industry or government, to the problems
they will be called upon to solve. Few experts will be able to apply their
disciplinary background to a wider range of social issues, and experts
will need extraordinary courage to function in a truly critical sense, since
their careers will still be rooted in the same industrial-governmental
milieu. What will happen to the expert who tries to serve the public
interest by calling for a halt to a particular line of research? A test
case is before us now, involving radiation safety standards. Drs. Goffman and Tamplin have challenged the AEC and its affiliates in industry
and the universities.
Folk's central thesis must be repeated here: assessment and control
are essentially policymaking processes, and as such, will be embroiled
in political controversy. He fears the repetition of nonrational policymaking processes which result in agency establishment of "standards
at levels slightly below that at which people complain vigorously ...
thus keep[ing] the public sullen but not mutinous."' Designs for
central or supreme assessment and control authorities must meet these
issues squarely if real change is to occur.
Let us briefly consider peer groups who are well-positioned to
assess and control early in the basic and applied science stages.
Folk, The Role of Technology Assessment in Public Policy, Dec. 29, 1969 (AAAS
Meeting Paper).
8id.
7
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Based on personal observation in part, I do not think scientific
peer groups presently have the objectivity or capability to function as
coherent and humane social controls. The members of a peer group
share the narrow confines of their discipline and individual success is
measured by the degree to which one plunges more deeply into, and
more narrowly draws the bounds of, his research. There are no peer
group rewards for activities or perceptions which extend beyond the
discipline or relate it to social problems. Members are therefore not
motivated nor trained to relate their peer group activity to broader
social concerns, and because of their closeness and commitment to their
work, they are unable to objectively assess implications and recommend
controls.
Genetic research today provides us with a fully developed case in
point. It is proceeding rapidly in the United States and Britain, and
periodically, significant breakthroughs are announced. Members of the
peer group and others have frequently discussed the potential applications of their work, and it has become a fashionable topic. Despite the
potential for genetic engineering and its misuse for political and social
goals repugnant to our professed values, this work continues at an
urgent pace. It would seem that the historical evidence of the political
misuse of science and technology in this century would at least bring
about a slight pause or slowdown in activities until our legal and other
control systems have time to prepare principles to control experimentation and to provide other public and private safeguards.
It is a disturbing experience to discuss these issues with biologists.
Their responses avoid the central issue of slowing or suspending work
to formulate controls and include the following:
If we don't do it, somebody else will;
Don't worry about secret and horrible developments, all work is done
in large expensive labs funded by the government;
Further work will improve the health of society and upgrade the gene
pool;
Cloning of humans is at least 5 (or 10) years away;
Science is intrinsically valuable in its contribtuion to man's collective
knowledge, and it must not be controlled for social purposes of any

sort.
Self-enclosed peer groups cannot be entrusted with self-control,
perhaps because of their narrow disciplinary backgrounds or self-interest,
or because our educational system does not foster ethical and interdisciplinary values in professional training.9
Finally, we must consider the problems of education. Our graduate
schools and departments represent artificial divisions of knowledge
and experience, and deprive students of important opportunities and
professional qualities. Substantive specialization and procedural barriers
9

See Morgenthau, Modern Science and Political Power, 64 COIUM. L. REV. 1386 (1964).
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prevent students from working with colleagues in other disciplines, and
often from clinical work of a socially relevant nature. As a result,
students are deprived of the chance to acquire some infornation on
values, attitudes, and methods of other disciplines, and of the opportunity to synthesize and apply the results to social issues. These limitations in training are then reflected in careers and social problems.
The social control of science and technology will be a troublesome
and never wholly successful undertaking. It bears a potential for the
politicization and regimentation of intellectual activity, which has been
realized in Russian genetics. Nor will the task lend itself to a specific
solution - there are no administrative, legislative, or judicial panaceas.
It must be recognized that future impact assessment and derivative
control will always be limited as man's intellectual and imaginative
resources are limited. Our measuring devices are still too crude to discern
pernicious impacts in many cases. The practice is made more difficult
and speculative as it is undertaken further back along the spectrum
before developmental technology.
But the practice must begin and develop, and pervade all the social
control mechanisms we now have and may devise. There are a number
of reforms that can be introduced in our present array of social controls.
Independent adversaries must be fostered. A tax-exempt status
ruling by the IRS would be a helpful first step for citizen's groups
pursuing activities in the public interest - e.g., as demonstrated by
their concern for public health. Multiple-year grants to interdisciplinary
groups, perhaps based at universities, could foster independent adversaries by establishing new career patterns. Congress, through its committee structure and Reference Service, should assist in this process.
Litigants should continue to press for responses from the legal
system. Environmental litigation has been marked by ingenuity, but it
lacks a coherent rationale. If Sierra Club v. Hickel1" is an omen of
anything, it may be that mere displeasure or aggravation of elitist values
held by a citizen's group will not be sufficient to challenge agency and
industrial action which serves economic or public recreational interests,
even though on a crass and commercial basis. Perhaps this is as it should
be. Litigation to control environmental quality and science and technology should seek a coherent and important raison d'etre - e.g.,
public health.
Public health, in both physical and psychic terms, includes aesthetic
and recreational values and the importance of eco-systems. Public health
must therefore provide the nexus between citizen group social action or
litigation and the public interest. The federal agencies, under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)," must now consider
10 39 U.S.L.W. 2180-81 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1970).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
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health effects. Establishing public health as the nexus does not simplify
decisionmaking but it does reduce subjective value clashes and uses
science and technology in a beneficial manner.
Administrative agencies must be reorganized sensibly in light of
national needs and available scientific and technological resources.
Legislation must be generated to provide guidelines for the administrative agencies, similar to those provided by NEPA, which impose
substantive and procedural duties on all federal agencies to implement
a broad policy of preventing and eliminating environmental damage.
Section 102(2) of NEPA requires that the federal agencies, in their
policies, recommendations, and other major federal actions affecting
environmental quality, shall
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach ... in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) ... insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values... be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation... and other major Federal
actions ... detailed statement .. on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between... short-term uses. . . and
long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved ....
(D) study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives .... 12
We can only speculate on what the real impact of NEPA will be
on environmental quality. Perhaps its primary significance will be to
instill certain habits and values in federal officials and their expert
resources. The habits would hopefully include interdisciplinaryassessment and consideration of alternatives, and a value system which will
include health and aesthetic considerations.
Realistically, we can expect NEPA to slow down the agency
decisionmaking process and this will help matters. Finally, NEPA will
bring about the generation of information by the federal agencies which
should become available in useful form to adversaries who invoke the
Freedom of Information Act.1 The broad-based studies of harmful
effects and alternatives by the agencies will be helpful, either because
of contents or omissions, to environmental action groups. Hopefully,
executive privilege and other exceptions to the Freedom of Information
U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1970). A full review of NEPA is presented in an unpublished article by Ronald C. Peterson, Yale Law School, entitled Title I of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. It is available from the Environmental Law Institute,
1346 Conn. Ave., Washington, D.C.

12 42

13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970).
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Act will not be invoked to the detriment of Congressional purpose as
expressed in NEPA. Unfortunately, this has occurred in Soucie v.
DuBridge,14 where the Office of Science and Technology report to the
President on the SST was successfully withheld from conservationists.
Obviously, NEPA will also bring about some assessment and agency
control of science and technology, when environmental effects are
predicted. However, there is a need for legislation, similarly grounded
in a multiple-value system and the habit of assessment, which will more
directly confront the need for a priori control of science and technology.
This legislation should be directed at the substantial agency sponsorship
of research and development, and thereby regulate federal procurement
and government contractor activities.
Finally, the most important social control must be discussededucation. The training and values of our professionals in law, engineering, and other fields must be responsive to the problems that beset
society. The intense specialization that marks graduate education fosters
narrow professionalism in subsequent careers. Peer group rewards have
not been provided to members who apply their training to problems
which extend beyond disciplinary confines.
No new degree programs will provide us with the answers. Rather,
every degree program we now have must be enriched with interdisciplinary, clinical, or preferably problem-focused components. Interdisciplinary does not mean antidisciplinary.
It is my good fortune to be a part of several innovative developments in higher education. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
the School of Engineering is moving in new, exciting directions to confront problems of bio-medical engineering, and environmental quality.
The Civil Engineering Department has brought into its faculty and
academic structure an interdisciplinary team made up of a political
scientist, a lawyer, and an economist to work with the engineering
faculty on water resources, transportation systems, systems engineering,
and environmental quality. Engineering students can now enrich their
academic programs with courses and research which relate their engineering disciplines to the full complexity of the social context in which
they will eventually work. A number of engineering students will soon
join with members of the Harvard and Boston University Law Schools'
Environmental Law Societies on a number of projects confronting local
and national environmental issues.
An experimental 2-year masters program on the Social Application
has also been launched. This program will provide
Technology
of
members the opportunity to confront a complex social problem, fully
explore all aspects of the problem, and apply their learning to its
resolution in a pragmatic context. Off-campus research and learning-by1439 U.S.L.W. 2123 (D.C. Colo. Aug. 25, 1970).
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doing will hopefully produce a new type of professional ideally suited
for public service. A core group of courses is now being devised and
will include law, government and bureaucracy, applied economics, and
project-related technology.
Professor Jerrold Zacharias is now working on adapting MIT's
advanced degree programs to specifically train students for college
teaching careers in science and engineering. A mastery of a discipline,
educational methods and technology, ethical and legal materials, and
interdisciplinary research as vehicles for educating are now considered
to be important features of this development. Graduates will be expected
to bring breadth and innovative qualities to their teaching careers and
will be able to relate their discipline to the social context.
Finally, at Boston University Law School, the new Center for Law
and the Health Sciences has established a program which enables law
students to engage in work with graduate students from other disciplines
on social problems of a health-related nature. Student and faculty participants are drawn from different disciplines and institutions, and
students will receive academic credit through ad hoc institutional
arrangements.
Washington, D.C., chief circuit judge, David Bazelon, has played
a major role in this undertaking and he presided over the recently
completed summer pilot program. During this program, 15 graduate
students from Boston University, Brandeis, Harvard, and MIT divided
into four interdisciplinary teams and each team confronted a complex
health problem: genetic counseling, health insurance reform, multipleservice health centers, or the training of mental health professionals.
Each team contained a law student, medical student, economist or urban
planner, and student from a discipline particularly relevant to the
problem - e.g., bioengineering, ethics, etc. Fifteen faculty members,
representing a number of disciplines, served as a general resource to
the students at scheduled meetings and informal sessions.
Interdisciplinary education presents a number of organizational
problems and a number of unique educational benefits. Much was
learned from the summer pilot program, and the ongoing program is
now about to commence.
Problem orientation has proven to be an important aspect of the
interdisciplinary program, in that it forces learning, synthesis, and
application onto students, while enabling them to undertake considerable initiative in defining and working on the problem in a context of
competing values. With this approach the Center hopes to enrich the
graduate education of a number of students and enable them to function
effectively in health related careers.
The social control of science and technology, through the training
of new kinds of professionals, is one of the most important tasks at
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hand for law schools, schools of science and engineering, and other
programs of higher education. This task must become an ongoing
process, and needs interdisciplinary cooperation and public agency
support. Law faculty, in particular, are needed to help build and
implement these new programs of public service which are related to
the social system and values. For it is only out of individual and collective wisdom and temperance induced by an appreciation of another's
values that we will control science and technology in a coherent and
humane fashion.

